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Introduction
A theoretical literature focused on fiscal federalism argues that intergovernmental transfers can be designed to increase efficiency and to redistribute resources equitably (Oates, 1999) but, in practice, critics argue that intergovernmental transfers are more likely to be designed to pursue political ambition (Ferejohn, 1974; Rogoff and Siebert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) . A growing literature has identified the way that transfers have been designed to win votes (especially in developing countries). Politicians have designed transfers "….to enforce their electoral advantage" (Golden and Min, 2013:86) . In this paper, the first objective is to question whether politicians in Mexico have designed intergovernmental transfers to win votes. (ii) An analysis of the disbursement of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico is also likely to offer insight into the relevance of changes in the intensity of electoral competition. Between 1929 and 2000, Mexico was governed by the same political party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) and there was very little competition. Every president, state governor, senator and deputy were members of the PRI. In 1989, the first representative from a political party other than the PRI was elected governor (in the northern border state of Baja California). In the federal election of 1997 the PRI failed to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. It was only in 1998 that the PRI lost their qualified majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. 1 Despite this the PRI maintains a large subnational state government presence (Timmons and Broid 2013) .
(iii) An analysis of the disbursement of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico is also likely to offer insight into the relevance of the constraints that have been introduced to reduce politicians' reliance on 'distributive politics'. The first of these constraints is reliance on pre-determined formulae when designing intergovernmental transfers. In Mexico, the Chamber of Deputies (the Lower Chamber) has exclusive authority to approve (or reject) budgets and, since 2000, Mexican states have lobbied the Lower Chamber (Olmeda 2009 ). As the Chamber now receives proposals based on pre-determined formulae, the expectation is that pre-determined formulae will reduce politicians' discretion to rely on transfers to win votes.
A second constraint in Mexico is that incumbent politicians are not able to stand for immediate re-election to local, or to national, office. This constitutional constraint is designed to reduce the likelihood that politicians will focus on the self-serving strategy of approving transfers to maximise their personal popularity in their own constituencies. 2 The expectation is that this constraint will reduce politicians' incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win votes.
The second objective in this paper is to explore, more generally, incumbents' incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win votes. When are they more likely to design intergovernmental transfers to reward core supporters and when are they more likely to design intergovernmental transfers to win votes? The final objective is to focus on their discretion to rely on intergovernmental transfers. Are constitutional constraints (such as predetermined formulae for intergovernmental transfers) likely to eliminate incumbents' discretion to design intergovernmental transfers to pursue electoral ambitions?
In the next section of the paper attention focuses on politicians' strategies to win political popularity. Section three describes the institutional background in which politicians allocate intergovernmental transfers. Section four of the paper describes the data and the model employed to test predictions formed in section two. The final section of the paper considers conclusions and policy recommendations.
Intergovernmental Transfers and Electoral Ambition
It is possible to draw on a well-established literature on 'distributive politics' to consider the alternative strategies that politicians might call on to win electoral support. When Golden and Min (2013) surveyed this literature they referred to the first strategy as one of favouritism. Incumbents disburse transfers to favour political (or ethnic) groups. Politicians are able to reward their core supporters with the rents they are able to disburse while they are in office.
The second strategy focuses on competition for votes. In this literature, studies often call on Dixit and Londregan's (1996) model, which suggests that politicians disburse transfers to groups of voters within a single constituency. While voters are assumed to have exogenous and fixed ideologies, some will support a political party further from their partisan reference point if that party offers a transfer that is large enough to outweigh their ideological attachment. Voters with strong partisan attachments require larger transfers than 'moderates'. Politicians usually compete for moderates (or 'swing voters'). It is impossible to ignore the likelihood that risk-averse politicians might target core supporters if they feel they have a substantial informational advantage about the nature of the transfers that will win support from core supporters (also see Cox and McCubbins, 1986) . But Golden and Min (2013:79) argue that the "…results in (this) line of research are usually interpreted as favouring the swing-voters hypothesis". In some instances, incumbents reward core supporters in jurisdictions with the highest proportion of votes for incumbents (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Hanes, 2007) . However, in many other studies politicians design transfers to win 'swing states' (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) .
When exploring politicians' incentive to win votes, Golden and Min (2013) In this literature the question is "… whether politicians seeming to improve their chances of winning a forthcoming election deliberately allocate goods and services just prior to an election" (Golden and Min, 2013: 83) .
When predicting politicians' behaviour in Mexico it is important to recognise the emergence and growth of electoral competition. In this paper, the hypothesis is that incumbents' strategies depend on their perception of the likelihood that they will be returned to office (see Frey and Schneider, 1978a; 1978b) . The greater their perception of the intensity of electoral competition, the greater the likelihood that they will rely on a 'political business cycle' (Nordhaus 1975) . The greater their perception of the intensity of electoral competition, the greater the incentive to consider the timing of elections and the importance of winning swing states.
In this paper, the objective is to focus on the design of intergovernmental transfers approved by 
Institutional Background
In this section of the paper the objective is to describe (i) the influence that the Lower Chamber is now able to exert and (ii) the intergovernmental transfers that the Lower Chamber has approved. whereby the states surrendered the majority of its revenue raising powers to the federal government, in return for a guaranteed share of revenue in the form of federal transfers. As such, these transfers are the states own revenue by law.
Control of the Chamber of Deputies is very important. Gutiérrez et al. (2001) note that in many other federations this process would also require approval by a second chamber. Before 1998, discretion over revenue-sharing rested with the President and with the chief economic ministries (Montero, 2001) . Today, the Chamber of Deputies is able to adjust the budget presented by the Executive.
When considering the discretion that the Chamber of Deputies has exercised, attention focuses on the extent to which it has approved transfers that differed from formulae-driven proposals. Sour et al. (2004) offer insight into the influence that the Chamber exerted when it approved budgets during the LVII (1998 LVII ( -2000 and LVIII (2001 LVIII ( -2003 legislatures. They compared the Executive's proposals and the budgets that the Chamber approved. Table 1 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE >
The Chamber has exercised discretion by approving transfers that differ from proposals based on pre-determined formulae (rather than by changing pre-determine formulae). With this awareness of the Chamber's discretion, a recent study of fiscal federal relations in Mexico refers to the 'ease' with which states "…lobby for higher federal transfers" (Caldera Sánchez 2013:17).
Federal governments don't enforce a hard budget on the states and extraordinary transfers still exist despite fiscal reforms.
Langston (2010) Timmons and Broid (2013) also note that Mexican states can exercise discretion in the allocation of transfers from the states to municipalities. This is either done explicitly or through changes to the allocation formula used for municipal transfers. Their further analysis suggests a partisan bias in transfers to municipalities governed by the PRI, but through formula allocation changes and through the short-term actions of governors e.g. where legislation is passed with weak scrutiny.
In this paper, attention will focus on transfers from the federal government to the Mexican states in the knowledge that transfers approved by the Chamber of Deputies have differed from proposals based on pre-determined formulae. Have political representatives in the Chamber exercised this discretion systematically? Have they exercised discretion in pursuit of political ambition?
(ii) Intergovernmental transfers to Mexican states are 43.4% of Mexico's total tax revenue, compared to an average of 10.4% for 8 other OECD economies (Bergvall et al. 2006) . The corollary of this is that sub-central government 'own revenue' is a very small percentage of total revenue. Table 2 . Across the 31 states, on average, transfers amount to 9,432 Mexican Pesos per capita but the standard deviation is significant at 2,495 Pesos per capita. Richer states in the north contributed the largest shares of tax revenues to the federal government, but they received less (in per capita terms) than states in the south.
< TABLE 2 NEAR HERE >
It is important to note the distinction between two forms of intergovernmental transfers:
discretionary ( 
Twenty per cent of finance for the Fondo General is provided by revenue from the
Recaudación Federal Participable (RFP). The RFP comprises all tax revenue collected by the federal government, plus revenue from oil and mining rights but with the exception of (i) revenue levied on the road tax, the new vehicles tax and the special taxes on products and services, (ii) tax refunds and (iii) other minor exclusions. The other seven funds of Participaciones are mainly financed from the RFP; from oil royalties and from special taxes on alcohol and tobacco. The formulae for all eight funds is summarized in Table 1A of the Appendix.
(ii) Aportaciones: This system of non-discretionary transfers was introduced in 1997 with the consolidation of several categories of spending. 6 The transfers are distributed through eight different funds. The four largest funds in 2010 were for (i) education (59%), health (12%), social infrastructure (9%) and municipal development (9%) (Caldera Sanchez 2013). Earmarked transfers for education and for health (to pay teachers' and doctors' salaries) form the bulk of et al., 2007) . Each fund has its own predetermined formulae, e.g.:
(a) education funds depend largely on school enrolment; (b) health funds depend largely on inventories of medical infrastructure;
(c) social infrastructure funds (financed through the RFP) depend largely on estimates of poverty; per capita income; sewage and water service availability.
The formulae used for the allocation of the eight funds of the Aportaciones is summarized in Table   2A of the Appendix.
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The distinction between conditional and unconditional grants will become important later in the paper when reflecting on strategies to disburse transfers to win votes. One of the advantages of disbursement to core supporters is that incumbents have greater knowledge of core supporters'
preferences (Box and McCubbins 1986) . However, if local politicians of the same party as the incumbent at federal government are prepared to credit the federal-government incumbent when they receive transfers, an increase in unconditional transfers (that can be spent at the discretion of the recipient) might also be effective when competing for votes. Oates (1972) emphasised the importance of local governments' greater knowledge of local preferences to ensure that expenditures match the preferences of the median voter in the local jurisdiction. Here the intention is to consider the politics of disbursement of aggregate transfers and the disbursement of the unconditional (discretionary) Participaciones, because this greater knowledge of supportive local politicians might ensure that unconditional disbursements will be even more effective in terms of winning votes.
Throughout the empirical sections of the paper the question is whether the differences between formulae-driven proposals received by the Chamber and transfers approved by the Chamber reflected the pursuit of political ambition. Have politicians focused systematically on the timing of elections and on the importance of winning 'swing states'?
Testing Predictions
The Data and the Model 
The variables trit and yit-1 are expressed in natural logarithms. A one-period lag structure for the independent variables is used to account for administrative delays in the reaction of per capita transfer allocations, or delays due to federal budgetary processes. Lagged transfers capture also the persistence or inertia in the evolution of transfers. Indeed, the use of predetermined formulae in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers makes both conditional and unconditional transfers more persistent.
In order to test the proposition that politicians in Mexico have designed intergovernmental transfers to win votes, it is also necessary to consider the relevance of the many other variables that might have acted as determinants of intergovernmental transfers. With evidence (Wildavsky 1988) that budgetary transfers in the current year are likely to depend on transfers that adjust for errors in the past, trit-1 was included in equation (1), with the expectation that δ1>0. As the institutional arrangement in Mexico is that the federal government acts as an agent, collecting tax revenues on behalf of local jurisdictions, it is also important to consider GDP per capita. To account for the reimbursement principle (principio resarcitorio), whereby richer states receive larger transfers (reflecting their higher contributions to federal tax revenues), y (the log level of real state GDP per capita) is included in equation (1) and the expectation is that δ2>0.
As federal governments might have disbursed higher transfers to states with higher unemployment rates (un) and to states with a higher dependency ratio (dr), these control variables are also included in equation (1), with the expectation that δ3>0 and δ4 >0. The equation also includes the ratio of own revenue to total revenue (rev) and here the expectation is that δ5<0.
With the likelihood that intergovernmental transfers may have been designed to win votes, transfers are likely to have been higher in election years (elect). This study focuses on the fixed term elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Transfers are also likely to have depended on the difference in the vote-share for the incumbent party and for its nearest rival (margin) in each Mexican state. The smaller the difference in the vote margin between the two parties, the larger the expected transfers (so δ7 <0). Panel-level effects are represented by and idiosyncratic time effects by . All reported estimated standard errors are clustered at the state level, so allowing for heteroscedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation between observations within each state.
The Results
Our chosen econometric specification includes the lagged level of transfers distributed to the states. This is important, since it enables us to differentiate between the short run and long run effects of our determinants (Jennes and Persyn 2015) . Moreover, the allocation of transfers might be slow to adjust over time and conditional on past amounts, particularly in the Mexican case where allocation formulas are deemed particularly important to what states are expected to receive.
A problem that emerges when one tries to estimate the model in (1) using standard OLS methods is that, by including the lagged value of transfers on the right-hand side as a regressor, there is a bias caused by the correlation between this lagged variable and the error term. Controlling for a potential lagged transfers effect is very important in the context of Mexican transfers, since the formulaic allocation of transfers implies persistence should be expected and lobbying gives the potential to ensure a similar transfer allocation to the year before. To avoid such bias, we follow the example of Veiga and Veiga (2013) and Huang and Cheng (2012) , who also employ the System Generalized Method of the Moments (SYS-GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in modelling fiscal transfers in Portugal and China, respectively. Under SYS-GMM lags and lagged differences are employed to instrument for any endogenous variable. Relative to ordinary fixed effects models, SYS-GMM has the advantage of allowing the consistent estimation of endogenous right-hand-sideariables, such as the lag of the dependent variable in equation (1), which account for persistence in the allocation of transfers. By construction, the choice of the appropriate number of lags (levels and differences) provides estimators free from endogeneity problems, as long as lags and lagged differences are uncorrelated with the error term in (1). Moreover, SYS-GMM estimators are said to be consistent if there is no second order serial correlation in the residuals according to the Arellano-Bond test and if the instruments employed are valid according to the Hansen test. Both tests are reported along the main estimates. We also report the difference-in-Hansen test for the exogeneity of instruments subset. Under the null hypothesis, the instruments subset is uncorrelated with the error term. Along with the previous two tests, this test needs to be satisfied to validate our SYS-GMM estimators.
The results from the SYS-GMM estimation of (1) are reported in Table 4 . Persistence in the allocation of transfers (the impact of the previous year's transfers) is significant for both unconditional and conditional transfers. As might be expected, the allocation of transfers has a high degree of persistence, with monies distributed today being largely driven by allocations in the past year. The economic size of the state, as reflected in the state's GDP per capita, has a statistically significant and positive effect on both unconditional and conditional transfers. The coefficients are small in magnitude, implying that transfers are income inelastic, also the marginal effect is slightly stronger for unconditional transfers, which might be expected given the reimbursement principle (principio resarcitorio). Unemployment has no influence on transfers. This might be due to the fact that Mexico does not provide unemployment welfare benefits to its population. However, the dependency ratio drit-1 is statistically significant for overall transfers and for conditional transfers.
This result might, in part, be explained by the importance of the poverty alleviation programmes that exist in Mexico (quantified as part of conditional transfers). The elasticity of 1.67 implies a 1% rise in the dependency ratio raises conditional transfers by 1.67%. The lagged value of the own to total revenue ratio (rev) is not statistically significant, implying the allocation of transfers is not sensitive to the extent to which states generate revenue from within their own borders.
< TABLE 4 NEAR HERE >
While the pattern of transfers across states is not sensitive to the state governments' ability to raise local government finance, total transfers are likely to be sensitive to the size of the federal government's revenue. Figure 2 shows a positive correlation between Mexico's federal revenue per capita and transfers per capita over the sample period. In Mexico, federal government revenues are likely to be sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices (as Mexico is a net exporter of crude oil and the government owns a significant proportion of the oil extraction rights).
< FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE >
Returning to While intergovernmental transfers are likely to increase the popularity of the party in office in the local jurisdiction (Mueller 2003) , incumbents at federal government also have an incentive to favour a 'swing state' controlled (with a narrow margin) by a competing party, as long as they believe that they can persuade local voters of the benevolence of the incumbent party at federal government. In Mexico, it was also the case that local jurisdictions with narrow majorities were Deputies from each political party attached priority to quid pro quo arrangements that favoured jurisdictions in which their party held a narrow majority, in return for the support they might provide for increased transfers to jurisdictions in which a competing political party held a narrow majority.
Turning to the final question of whether there is any support for the proposition that the Chamber of Deputies also rewarded core supporters, consider the final prediction: 
The hypothesis is that transfers will be greater to the states that offer the incumbent party the greatest support. In Table 5 , the evidence is that intergovernmental transfers are higher for the states that offer lower electoral support to the incumbent political party in the Lower Chamber (as measured by voteit-1).
< TABLE 5 NEAR HERE >
This result is curious. As it implies that the most disloyal of states will receive the highest reward (ceteris paribus), there is no obvious incentive to signal this if the incumbents' intention is to win more votes in the next election. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) present a persuasive critique of the proposition that core voters can always be relied on to support an incumbent. They argue that "…voters become loyal to the party not only because they receive material benefits today, but because they expect to continue to receive benefits in the future" (p. 24). It is difficult to rationalise systematic delivery of the highest reward to the least supportive voters. Diaz-Cayeros et al.
acknowledge that there might often be incentives to offer rewards to swing voters because "… the temptation to buy swing voters on spot necessarily increases in highly competitive elections," (p.117). However, at best, the negative coefficient on voteit-1 is spurious. 
Conclusions
The first conclusion in this paper is that the results in this paper are consistent with the prediction that incumbents in Mexico have designed intergovernmental transfers to win votes.
After allowing for the impact of other determinants of intergovernmental transfers, the results indicate that transfers increased in election years and that transfers favoured voters in 'swing states'.
When focusing on other determinants of intergovernmental transfers, transfers in the current year have also depended on transfers received in the past, with an adjustment for errors (Wildavsky 1988) . Transfers have depended on GDP per capita (because the federal government assumed the role of raising tax and returning tax revenues to the citizens in the jurisdictions that pay tax) and they have also been higher for states with higher dependency ratios. However, the results are also consistent with the criticism that the timing and the pattern of intergovernmental transfers reflects politicians' pursuit of political ambition.
The second conclusion is that results in this paper contribute to the literature that focuses on incumbents' strategies. Some studies provide evidence that governments disburse transfers to core 
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(ii) Electoral competition sharpens the trade-off between reliance on a strategy that increases the long-run loyalty of core voters and a strategy that responds to the immediacy of winning the support of the median voters. Frey and Schneider (1978a; 1978b) demonstrate that, governments' inclination to deliver rents to core supporters, increases as the size of the electoral majority increases. When electoral margins are likely to be narrow, it is preferable to rely on disbursements to voters in 'swing states', where "..moderate voters who are indifferent between two parties can more easily be bought…" (Larcinese et al. 2006) . In this paper, evidence is consistent with the proposition that incumbents at federal government have focused on electoral competition. The evidence is that both conditional and unconditional transfers increased in election years. It is also the case that representatives at federal government have increased conditional transfers by a greater extent to the states that are likely to deliver the narrowest electoral margin. The more that conditional transfers are associated with intervention by federal governments (to finance specific programmes), the greater the impact that an increase in conditional transfers is likely to exert in elections for representatives to the Chamber of Deputies.
The third conclusion in this paper is that it is not necessarily the case that reliance on pre-determined formulae for intergovernmental transfers, and reliance on a constitutional constraint on re-election to office, will eliminate the likelihood that politicians' will design intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. As in Ghana (Banful 2011) and in
Portugal (Veiga and Pinho 2007) , pre-determined formulae in Mexico failed to eliminate politicians' discretion to design transfers to pursue political ambition.
The experience in Mexico, of reliance on a constitutional constraint (designed to ensure that politicians are not able to seek immediate re-election), offers more general insight into the likelihood that this constitutional constraint might eliminate politicians' pursuit of self-serving strategies. When predicting the extent to which constitutional constraints are likely to be successful, it is important to consider the way that politicians are likely to respond, collectively, to the constraint that has been introduced. The experience in Mexico is that, as politicians cannot stand for immediate re-election in their own constituencies, they must find future employment after their term of office and their prospects often depend on the influence that their political party is able to exert on their behalf (to find employment within their party's administration; within the government bureaucracy, or within lobby-group organisations). Also, as incumbents are able to become candidates after spending one term out of office, the fortunes of their party are also relevant when a politician intends to seek political office as a representative of a different constituency. 11 Far from distancing politicians from the pursuit of political ambition, the constraint has heightened the importance of the electoral success of the incumbents' political party. As Moreno (2005:3) Politicians are likely to have a greater incentive to design intergovernmental transfers to win votes (rather than reward core supporters) when electoral competition increases, and pre-determined formulae and re-election constraints are unlikely to eliminate incumbents' discretion to rely on transfers to win votes. The formula depends on each state's: inventory of medical infrastructure; number of staff; operating expenses; investment and other resources specifically allocated by the Budget of Expenditures of the Federation (to promote equity in the health services). The formula for this last component depends on the deviation of the health budget deficit of each state compared to the total health budget deficit of all states "below the minimum accepted" by all states' deficit. The category "minimum accepted" is based on a balance between (i) the population of each state; (ii) the level of poverty and (iii) the level of mortality. Additional resources may be approved by the Federal Budget. (The Ministry of Health announces the formulae in the Official Diary.) 3. Contribution Fund for Social Infrastructure (FAIS) Depends on: income per capita; average education of the household; availability of living space; drainage; electricity and fuel for cooking (all measured and weighted at the household level). (The formulae for allocations to municipalities depends on: the employed population of the municipality earning less than two minimum wages; the municipal population aged 15 and over who cannot read and write; the local population living in private homes without availability of a drain connected to a septic tank, or street, and the local population living in private homes without electricity available. The formulae considers the specific priorities and compensatory strategies for the abatement of the lag in literacy, basic education and job training. Formulae are published by the Ministry of Education no later than January 31 each year in the Official Diary.
7.Contribution Fund for Public Security of the States and Distrito Federal
The formulae includes: the population of the states and Distrito Federal; the rate of prison occupancy; the implementation of crime prevention programmes; the resources allocated to support actions on public security developed by the municipalities, and the progress in implementing the National Program of Public Security on professionalism, equipment, technological modernization and infrastructure. 
